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Stationary Nash Equilibria for Average Stochastic Games with Finite State and Action Spaces
Authors: Lozovanu Dmitrii
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Abstract
We study the problem of the existence of stationary Nash equilibria in infinite $n$-person stochastic games with limiting average payoff criteria for the players. The state and action spaces in the games are assumed to be finite. We present some results for the existence of stationary Nash equilibria in a multichain average stochastic game with $n$ players. Based on constructive proof of these results we propose an approach for determining the optimal stationary strategies of the players in the case when stationary Nash equilibria in the game exist.Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science
5 Academiei str., Chisinau, MD−2028
Moldova
E-mail:
5 Academiei str., Chisinau, MD−2028
Moldova
E-mail:
Fulltext
– 0.20 Mb
Contents
- Lacunary Ideal Convergence in Probabilistic Normed Space
- The multiplicative Zagreb co-indices on two graph operators
- On Lagrange algorithm for reduced algebraic irrationalities
- Asymmetric ID-Based Encryption System, Using an Explicit Pairing Function of the Reciprocity Law
- Almost periodicity of functions on universal algebras
- Lattice of all topologies of countable module over countable rings
- Stationary Nash Equilibria for Average Stochastic Games with Finite State and Action Spaces
- General form transversals in groups
- Operations on level graphs of bipolar fuzzy graphs
- On pseudoisomorphy and distributivity of quasigroups
- On spectrum of medial T2-quasigroups
