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Identity, Ontology, and Frege's Problem
Authors: William J. Greenberg
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Abstract
It is argued that the semantic difference between sentences of the form "a = a" and "a = b" reflects a difference in their truth-makers. My account of these truth-makers combines a referential semantics -- singular terms are deemed to contribute nothing but their reference to the meaning of sentences in which these occur -- with an ontology of logically complex individuals. Against analyses in which Fregean senses are invoked to account for the difference in meaning between (sentences of the form) "a = a" and "a = b", this ontology invokes an Aristotelian notion of \textit{identity as oneness in substance} as the source of this difference, rendering Fregean senses otiose.USA
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Contents
- Bounds on Global Total Domination in Graphs
- Construction of a transitive orientation using B-stable subgraphs
- Maximum Inaccuracies of Second Order
- Measuring human emotions with modular neural networks and computer vision based applications
- Provably sender-deniable encryption scheme
- Modeling of meaning acquisition based on NL phrases using state transitions
- Identity, Ontology, and Frege's Problem
- Towards an Ontology of Individuals: Comments on "Identity, Ontology and Frege's Problem" of William Greenberg
