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IMCS/Publications/CSJM/Issues/CSJM v.11, n.3 (33), 2003/

Stability of generally efficient situation in finite cooperative games with parametric optimality principle ("from Pareto to Nash")

Authors: Vladimir A. Emelichev, Sergey E. Bukhtoyarov
Keywords: Finite cooperative game in normal form, Pareto optimal situation, Nash equilibrium situation, stability radius of generally efficient situation.

Abstract

A parametric optimality principle (choice function) in a finite cooperative game of several persons is determined. This principle is specified by means of partition of players set into coalitions. It generates a set of generally efficient situations. Extreme cases of such a partition correspond to Pareto optimal situation and Nash equilibrium situation. For a situation, efficient for a given partition, analysis of stability to independent perturbations of coefficients of linear payoff functions has been carried out. Extreme levels of perturbations that remain efficient are specified. MSC : 90C29, 90C31

V.A. Emelichev, S.E. Bukhtoyarov,
Belarusian State University
ave. Fr. Skoriny, 4,
Minsk, 220050, Belarus.
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