Postoptimal analysis of a finite cooperative game
Authors: Vladimir Emelichev, Olga Karelkina
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Abstract
We consider a finite cooperative game of several players with parameterized concept of equilibrium (optimality principles), when relations between players in coalition are based on the Pareto maximum. Introduction of this optimality principle allows to connect classical notions of the Pareto optimality and Nash equilibrium. Lower and upper bounds are obtained for the strong stability radius of the game under parameters perturbations with the assumption that arbitrary H\"{o}lder norms are defined in the space of outcomes and criteria space. Game classes with an infinite radius are defined.Vladimir Emelichev
Belarusian State University
ave. Independence, 4, Minsk 220030
Belarus
E-mail:
Olga Karelkina
Systems Research Institute, PAN
Newelska, 6, Warsaw 01-447
Poland
E-mail:
Belarusian State University
ave. Independence, 4, Minsk 220030
Belarus
E-mail:
Olga Karelkina
Systems Research Institute, PAN
Newelska, 6, Warsaw 01-447
Poland
E-mail:
Fulltext
– 0.17 Mb
Contents
- An iterative method for solving split minimization problem in Banach space with applications
- Homogenization of a lubrication problem in oscillating domain by two-scale convergence method
- Local growth of solutions of linear differential equations with analytic
- On non-discrete topologization of some countable skew fields
- Maximum nontrivial convex cover number of join and corona of graphs
- Algebraic View over Homogeneous Linear Recurrent Processes
- Localization of singular points of meromorphic functions based on interpolation by rational functions
- Postoptimal analysis of a finite cooperative game
